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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
In the Interest of

:

S.O., J.O., and C.K.
Children under the age of
eighteen years.

:
:

Val Newman and Ruth Kofod,

Case No. 981207-CA

:

Petitioners,

:

v.

:

Honorable Charles D. Behrens
State of Utah, Division of
Child and Family Services,

:

Respondents.

Priority 4

:
:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE OF UTAH
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (c) (Supp. 1998).
ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether petitioners were entitled to a shelter

hearing despite the fact that there had been no "removal" as
contemplated by Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-306 (Supp. 1997) .
Standard of Review:
Issues concerning statutory construction are questions
of law which are reviewed for correctness granting no deference
to the trial court.

State v. Child Support Enforcement, 888 P.2d

690, 691-92 (Utah App. 1994).
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2.

Whether petitioners were granted due process

sufficient to safeguard their limited interest in this minor
child.
Standard of review:
Constitutional questions are questions of law reviewed
for correctness with no deference given to the trial court.
State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 632 (Utah 1997).
STATUTES, RULES, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
1.

Juvenile Court Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-101 to -

914 (Supp. 1997).
2.

Termination of Parental Rights Act, Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-3a-401 to -414 (Supp. 1997).
(Addendum A ) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 7, 1996, two minor children, S.O. and
J.O., were taken into protective custody by the Division of Child
and Family Services (DCFS).

The Division filed a petition

alleging abuse and neglect of the two children.

Subsequently,

another sibling, C.K., was added to the petition as a child atrisk.

On October 16, 1996, the juvenile court adjudicated the

petition, and deprived the mother of custody of all three
children.

S.O. and J.O. were placed in the Division's custody;

C.K. was placed in the temporary custody and guardianship of
relatives, the Kofods.

The juvenile court later modified its

order and placed C.K. in the custody of Val Newman, another
relative.
2
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On September 4, 1997, the Division filed a Motion
requesting a review hearing with regard to C.K. to determine if
it was in the best interests of the child to remain in the
temporary custody of Val Newman in light of allegations that
C.K.'s biological parents were residing in Ms. Newman's home.
(R. 74-75; Addendum B ) .
1997.

The motion was heard on October 24,

The court determined that it was not in C.K.'s best

interests to remain in Newman's home and ordered that the child
be placed into DCFS custody.

(R. 145-47; Addendum C ) .

Newman

filed a Motion to Restore Custody on November 14, 1997 (R. 13334; Addendum D ) , but on February 13, 1998 the juvenile court
again found it was not in C.K.'s best interests to return to
Newman's home.

(R. 218-22; Addendum E ) .

Ruth Kofod, C.K.'s paternal grandmother, and Val Newman
filed a Motion to Intervene, a Petition for Extraordinary Relief,
and a Motion for Stay of proceedings on April 13, 1998.
41, 279-81, 284-85; Addendum F ) .

(R. 228-

Petitioners have recently

petitioned again for restoration of custody of C.K., and a
hearing is set before the juvenile court on October 5, 1998.
(Addendum G ) .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Chastity Ortiz is the mother of three children, S.O.
(dob 2/28/92), J.O. (dob 4/23/93), and C.K. (dob 4/8/96).
47).

C.K.'s father is John Kofod.

(R.

(R. 48). The fathers of

S.O. and J.O. are not at issue in this proceeding.

3
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On September 7, 1996, S.O. and J.O. were placed into
the protective custody of the Division of Child and Family
Services based upon physical abuse allegations.

(R. 1, 27).

Following a shelter hearing, DCFS was awarded custody and
guardianship of the two children.

(R. 11-12, 17-21) .

DCFS

subsequently learned that the mother had another child, C.K., a
five-month old infant, whom she had previously placed with the
child's paternal grandparents.

On October 10, 1996, the State

moved to amend its petition to include C.K.

(R. 34-35).

second amended petition was filed on October 16, 1996.

A
(R. 41-

44) .
At the adjudication hearing on the State's petition,
the mother admitted to the allegations of the State's second
amended petition.

Based upon the admissions, the juvenile court

found all three children to be neglected children, and concluded
it had jurisdiction over the parties.

(R. 46-50). As part of its

dispositional order, the court ordered (1) S.O. and J.O. placed
in DCFS custody and guardianship, (2) C.K. placed in the
temporary custody and guardianship of Ruth and John Kofod
(paternal grandparents) with DCFS providing protective
supervision services, and (3) DCFS to implement reunification
services to the mother with a return home goal for all the
children.

The court also ordered, with regard to all three

children, that "unless restricted by the terms of this or further
order, the Division of Family Services shall have the authority

4
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and responsibility as provided by law to determine where and with
whom the children shall live."

(R. 46-50, 52-53).

In March 1997, the court's order that C.K. be placed in
the temporary custody and guardianship with the Kofods was
modified to provide that because the grandparents were divorcing
custody/guardianship would be maintained by Ruth Kofod only.
64-66).

(R.

In April 1997, the order was further modif ied,#> upon

motion by the State, and temporary custody/guardianship was given
to Val (Kofod) Newman, C.K.'s paternal aunt, under an order of
DCFS protective supervision.

The Kofods had been residing in the

Newman home with C.K. for number of months and it was felt to be
in her best interests to remain there.

(R. 67-69).

In October 1997, the juvenile court held a permanency
review hearing pursuant to section 78-3a-312.

The court also

concurrently considered the State's Motion to Review Placement of
C.K., pursuant to section 78-3a-307 (6) .

Said motion was filed

upon DCFS learning that Newman was allowing the natural parents
to reside in her home.

Newman was sent a copy of the motion, was

given notice of the hearing and appeared for the hearing as
reflected in the court's order.1

(R. 72-75, 94-96).

At the October 1997 hearing, the court determined the
parents had failed to substantially comply with the DCFS service
plans, that the children were at risk to return to the parents,
2

The consolidated hearing was continued from the September
18th date based upon objections unrelated to the current matter,
and was again continued upon motion by the parents' counsel. The
hearing ultimately was held on October 24, 1997. (R. 97-101,
132) .
5
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that services and visitation be terminated, and that the goal
should be changed to adoption.

Regarding the State's motion to

review C.K.'s placement, the court found it was in the best
interest of C.K. to be removed from the kinship placement with
Val Newman, and placed into DCFS custody/guardianship.

The court

also ordered that Newman would have 3 0 days to come forward with
counsel to address the issue further, and that if she failed to
come forward, C.K.'s placement would become an adoptive
placement. (R. 145-47).
On November 14, 1997, a typed letter from Newman was
filed with the court.

The letter asked for custody of C.K. (R.

133-34) and was treated by the court as a Motion to Restore
Custody at a hearing on December 30, 1997.

Again Newman and Mrs.

Kofod were advised to obtain counsel, and the hearing was'
continued to February 13, 1998.

(R. 204-205).

On February 13, 1998, Newman and her counsel appeared
at a hearing to further consider C.K.'s placement.

Newman's

counsel argued the juvenile court should hold a shelter hearing
regarding C.K.'s removal from his client's home.

The court found

that, under section 78-3a-307(5) and (6), the statutes governing
kinship placements, a shelter hearing is not required.

Counsel

for the parties presented further argument on whether it would be
safe for C.K. to return to Newman's home, but did not put on
evidence or request an evidentiary hearing.

The court then found

it would not be in C.K.'s best interest to return to the Newman
home.

(R. 218-22).

Neither Newman or Kofod appealed this order.
6

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The State petitioned to terminate the parents' rights
to the three children (R. 165-73), and trial was scheduled for
April 20-21, 1998.

On April 21, 1998, C.K.'s parents voluntarily

relinquished their parental rights.~
Just prior to the relinquishment, on April 13, 1998,
Val Newman and Ruth Kofod filed a Motion to Intervene, a Petition
for Extraordinary Relief, and a Motion for Stay of proceedings.
(R. 228-41, 279-81, 284-85) .

Petitioners have since filed a

Petition to Restore Custody with the juvenile court, seeking
restoration of custody of C.K.,
October 5, 1998.

which is set for hearing on

(Addendum G ) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Petitioners argue that the juvenile court erred when it
denied their request for a shelter hearing.

This argument

misconstrues the purpose of a shelter hearing.

A shelter hearing

is only required when the State of Utah exercises the police
power of the state and removes a child from the custody of his
parent or guardian without prior judicial approval.

Under such

circumstances, a shelter hearing is required to provide immediate
judicial review to assure that the state's actions were proper.
In the present case, there was no independent state action and
thus no "removal" as contemplated by the shelter hearing statute.
What occurred in this case was that the court
determined, pursuant to a statutory requirement, that the

2

This order is not part of the appellate record, but was
attached to the State's initial response to this Petition.
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temporary kinship placement which it had previously ordered was
no longer appropriate.

Thus there was no "removal" as

contemplated by the shelter hearing statute. Rather it is a
lawful and proper exercise of judicial authority.

The fact that

petitioners disagree with the court and feel aggrieved does not,
in and of itself, constitute error.
Petitioners also seem to believe that legal custody and
guardianship over a child is fully and freely transferable as it
would be over a mere chattel.

Their arguments presuppose that

when there exists an unbroken chain of familial guardians, the
rights of the last relate back and fully encompass the rights of
the natural parents.
indefensible.

This argument is legally and morally

The purpose of the Child Welfare Reform Act is to

provide safety and permanency for abused and neglected children.
Allowing relatives to assert squatters rights in minor children
through adverse possession in contradiction to the best interests
of the child does not further these goals.
Finally, even assuming that petitioners possess, either
jointly or severally, some legally cognizable interest in the
child, that interest was fully considered by the juvenile court.
The court went out of its way to assure that petitioners were
given ample opportunity to present evidence on their own behalf.
Petitioners participated in numerous hearings over the course of
more than four months including two evidentiary hearings.
is far more than is even contemplated by our caselaw.

8
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This

ARGUMENT
I. THE JUVENILE COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED
THAT PETITIONERS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO A
SHELTER HEARING PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-3a-306
Petitioners' claim of error is that the juvenile court
was required to conduct a shelter hearing when it transferred
custody of C.K. to DCFS.

This argument is incorrect based upon

the very statute upon which they rely.
The statute clearly states under what circumstances a
shelter hearing must be held.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-306 (1)

reads, in pertinent part:
With regard to a child who has been removed
by the Division of Child and Family Services,
or who is in the protective custody of the
division, a shelter hearing shall be held
within 72 hours after removal of the child
from his home . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-306(l) (Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).
C.K. was never "removed" from anyone's home by DCFS, nor was she
ever in DCFS's protective custody.

Protective custody is defined

by Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-103(2)(b) as "shelter of a minor by the
Division of Child and Family Services from the time the minor is
removed from the home until the shelter hearing."

In the instant

case, C.K. was placed in the temporary custody and guardianship
of the Kofods by order of the juvenile court, not through
physical removal by the state.

The Court modified this original

order on several occasions, the last of which resulted in
temporary custody and guardianship being placed with DCFS.

9
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^

There is only one reason to convene a shelter hearing,
and that is to review the state's independent exercise of its
police power for reasonableness.

The shelter hearing thus

constitutes a judicial check upon the unbridled power of the
state.

It is not designed to be some sort of catch-all due

process hearing.

See generally State ex rel. M.V., 937 P.2d

1049, 1050-51 (Utah App. 1997) (noting that shelter hearing is an
interim order, not a final appealable order, and that only
purpose of shelter hearing is to determine reasonableness of
removal and need for continued removal).
In support of their alleged right to a shelter hearing,
petitioners argue that the only way the juvenile court could have
placed C.K. in a kinship placement is pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-3a-307(5)(a), which requires a shelter hearing.
argument is incorrect.

This

The juvenile court may make temporary

orders of custody upon the filing of a petition, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-3a-109 (5) , and specifically may make a relative placement
after adjudication of a petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 783a-118(2)(b).3
Accordingly, the juvenile court had full authority to
enter temporary orders of custody with relatives as it saw fit

3

It is worth noting that petitioners' reliance upon Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3a-307 is somewhat of a double-edged sword. Under
section 78-3a-307(6) , it is the juvenile court's express
obligation to review the placement to assure that it remains in
the child's best interests. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-307(6)
(Supp. 1997) . Significantly, the juvenile court believed it was
reviewing the placement under -307(6) when it transferred custody
to DCFS. See Addenda C and E.
10
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and to modify those orders as was in the best interests of the
minor child.

No shelter hearing was required because there was

no unilateral state action involved necessitating that type of
judicial review contemplated by the shelter hearing statute.
II. PETITIONERS DO NOT POSSESS THE LEGAL
RIGHTS OF A BIOLOGICAL PARENT OR FULL LEGAL
GUARDIAN.
The essence of petitioners' argument is that they were
entitled to some sort of due process before being deprived of
their legally cognizable interest(s) in C.K.

This assertion may

be accurate to some extent, however, in order to determine what
sort of process was due petitioners, it is necessary to first
determine what sort of legally cognizable interest they actually
possess in this child, and then to see if the juvenile court gave
them due process commensurate with that interest.

See Summers v.

Wulffenstein, 616 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1980). 4
Petitioners believe that they are entitled to the full
legal protections such as would be granted to a biological or
adoptive parent or full legal guardian.

This is incorrect given

the facts of this case.

4

In Wulffenstein, the Supreme Court described a relative's
interest in the custody and welfare of a child as a liberty
interest, id. However, the Court did not determine the precise
level of due process required but merely determined that the
hearings in the juvenile court had been sufficient in that case.
Id.
11
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At the time these proceedings in the juvenile court
were initiated, petitioners had only physical custody of C.K.~
It is clear that they did not have legal custody because the
neglect petitions were prosecuted against the child's biological
parents.

Had petitioners been the legal guardians, the petitions

would have been directed against them.
Petitioners also make much of the fact that only S.O.
and J.O., C.K.'s siblings, were actually removed by the state at
the commencement of this action.

Whether or not C.K. was

"removed" along with her siblings at the inception of this action
is irrelevant.
Juvenile Court proceedings are commenced through the
filing of a petition.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-305.

When a child

is removed by DCFS, this petition must be filed on or before the
date of the shelter hearing.

Ld.

This does not mean, however,

that proceedings in the juvenile court can only be initiated
through the removal of a child, nor that any time the juvenile
court orders placement of a child a shelter hearing must be held.
The petition filed in this case alleged that the
juvenile court had jurisdiction over all three children.
petition was found to be true and correct.

This

Accordingly, the

D

While it is possible for a parent to legally delegate
custody and guardianship over a child to another person, there is
no evidence that this was done in this case. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 75-5-103 (Supp. 1997). Nor were there any prior district or
juvenile court orders transferring custody. Cf. State ex rel.
T.S., 927 P.2d 1124, 1126-27 (Utah App. 1996) (affirming order of.
juvenile court that "court constituted" custodian enjoys no
residual legal rights comparable to those of a parent).
12
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juvenile court properly assumed jurisdiction over all three
children, and thus was entitled to enter any appropriate
dispositional orders as it deemed just and proper.

See Utah Code

Ann. § 78-3a-118 (Supp. 1997) (enumerating various possible
dispositions).
Pursuant to this authority, the court placed C.K. in
the temporary custody and guardianship of the Kofods.

(R. 52).

At this point, the Kofods, for the first time, were given
temporary legal custody of C.K. by the juvenile court.
Subsequently, this custody was transferred to Ms. Kofod
alone, and then to Ms. Newman.

It is important to note that all

of these transfers were accomplished pursuant to the court's
jurisdiction over C.K.

No person objected to any of these

orders, and in fact, it appears that all parties were
substantially in agreement with these modifications up until the
point that custody was transferred to DCFS.
The critical distinction to be noted in this sequence
of events is that all orders of the juvenile court, with the
exception of orders terminating parental rights or expressly
granting permanent custody and guardianship, are legally
temporary.

See State ex rel. T.H. v. R.H., 860 P.2d 370, 374

(Utah App. 1993) . Accordingly, petitioners were never the full
legal custodians or guardians of C.K. as they allege, but rather
had temporary custody and guardianship, as granted by the
juvenile court, and subject to its review and/or modification.

13
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The final important question to be answered is just
whose rights are implicated in this appeal.

Petitioners have

appealed collectively as relatives but it is far from clear that
this is proper.

The Kofods never objected to the juvenile court

transferring temporary custody to Ms. Newman.

They should not

now be entitled to come forward and join in Ms. Newman's claim at
this late date.e
Essentially the argument of petitioners seems to be
that they, jointly and severally, have had a continuous chain of
custody over the child resulting in a legally cognizable
interest.

This argument presumes that a child is legally akin to

a chattel in that a continuous chain of physical possession
within a family connotes a legally recognizable property
interest.

This argument is legally wrong and morally repugnant.
Allowing a group of relatives to assert squatters

rights in a child by virtue of a period of adverse possession is
inconsistent with the best interests of the child.

Custody

proceedings involving minor children have always been conditioned
upon the notion that the best interests of the child are of
paramount concern.
(Utah 1982).

E.g., Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 40

Moreover, the entire Child Welfare Reform Act is

specifically designed to assure that the child's best interests

6

It is also possible, as argued by the Guardian Ad Litem,
that both the Kofods and Ms. Newman have waived their right to
challenge the juvenile court's transfers of custody by failing to
pursue timely appeals of those orders. See State ex rel. T.S.,
927 P.2d 1124, 1127 (Utah App. 1996) (holding where grandmother .
failed to appeal deprivation of custody she waived her right to
challenge that order.
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are served.

State ex rel. M.C., 940 P.2d 1229, 1237 (Utah App.

1997) (noting that child's welfare and best interests are
paramount under the Act).
To this end, the Act and the juvenile court both strive
to balance the rights of parents with the rights of children.
Kinship placements fit into this scheme as a potentially
appropriate temporary placement while parents seek to remedy
their deficiencies.

Kinship placements are often considered to

be preferable to foster placements because relatives may have an
established relationship with the children and generally can be
presumed to have the child's best interests in mind.

In some

cases kinship placements even become permanent placements when a
parent is unable or unwilling to care for a child.
However, this is not true in every case and it may
change during the pendency of a particular case.

The critical

factor is that mere consanguinity, standing alone, does not
guarantee that a relative will or should be chosen as a placement
unless that relative is appropriate.

Furthermore, the fact that

a relative may initially be found appropriate does not mean that
the relative will remain appropriate.

That is what occurred in

this case.
The juvenile court found that Ms. Newman was no longer
appropriate because she had been allowing improper contact with
the mother.7

A relative's ability to protect a child from a

Ms. Newman was well aware of this requirement as evidenced
by the service plan which she signed.
(R. 90-92).
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neglectful or abusive parent is a critical factor in assessing
the appropriateness of any kinship placement.

See Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-3a-307(5)(b)(ii)(A through F) (Supp. 1997) (listing factors
to be considered by the court in determining the appropriateness
of a kinship placement).

Relatives often have such dual

loyalties to both the offending parent and the child.

This

creates a conflict which can place the child at risk for
continued abuse or neglect, particularly in a case were parental
rights have been terminated.
The end results is that relatives have no absolute
inviolable right to custody, but rather must be considered on a
case by case basis.

See Wilson v. Family Servs. Div., 554 P.2d

227, 230 (Utah 1976) (noting only parents have actual vested
interest in custody cognizable by the law, relatives have" only
"dormant or inchoate right or interest").

Under Wilson,

relatives have only a very limited right to be considered as a
placement, if it is in the child's best interests, and the right
to be heard with respect to their opinion as to the child's best
interests."

Because the juvenile court appropriately considered

petitioners' limited rights in this case, their petition must
fail.

8

Petitioners point to the procedural protections afforded
foster parents pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-315 as support
for their right to due process. However, the rights of foster
parents are not analogous to the rights of relatives. Foster
parents are employed by the State of Utah as independent
contractors. As such, they have a clear financial, as well as
emotional, interest in the children in their custody. This is a
markedly different interest than that of a relative which makes
it inappropriate to compare the two.
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III. THE JUVENILE COURT AFFORDED PETITIONERS
DUE PROCESS IN EXCESS OF THAT WHICH WOULD BE
SUFFICIENT TO PROTECT THEIR LIMITED INTEREST
IN THESE MINOR CHILDREN.
Because petitioners are not parents or legal guardians
of these children, their only legally recognizable interest in
the children is that identified by our Supreme Court in Wilson.
Id.

The biological parents' parental rights having been

terminated, no party to these proceedings has any presumptive
right to custody of the children.

Accordingly, the operative

principle involved is the best interests of the children.

Under

Wilson, petitioners' only right is to a hearing and the
opportunity to be heard on the question of the children's best
interests.

Id.
This happened on several occasions during the cfturse of

the proceedings below.9

Val Newman was notified that the state

was seeking review of the court's placement of C.K. with her on
account of her allowing the biological parents to reside in her
home.

(R. 74-75; Addendum B ) .

Petitioners were present and

participated in the October 24, 1997 hearing wherein the children
were ordered placed with DCFS.

The Court gave them thirty days

to register any objections and to ask for another hearing.

9

It is important to note that petitioners have not provided
this Court with the transcripts of the hearings held in the
juvenile court. Despite this omission, petitioners attempt to
cast doubt upon the fairness of these hearings. Because there is
nothing in the record provided which supports such speculation
and because petitioners have not provided an adequate record,
this Court should presume the regularity of the proceedings held
in this case. E.g., State ex rel. J.M., 940 P.2d 527, 536 (Utah
App. 1997).
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Their only response was to file a handwritten note
requesting that the children be returned.

The juvenile court,

quite generously, construed this note as a motion for return of
custody and set the matter for a hearing.

Petitioners also

participated in several reviews prior to the hearing on their
"motion" which was held in February of 1998.

However, in their

brief, petitioners allege that they had no knowledge of the
allegations upon which the state based its alleged "removal" of
the children.

This argument is patently absurd.

Petitioners have been intimately involved in this
matter from its inception.
every hearing held.

They have been present at virtually

The juvenile court went out of its way to

assure that petitioners had every opportunity to present their
side of the case.

Petitioners did not avail themselves of any of

these opportunities.1^

It is hard to understand how convening a

shelter hearing at this late stage would serve any purpose given
the amount of time that has already been spent listening to
petitioners' complaints.

Because petitioners have already

received all the due process to which they are entitled, the
state requests that their petition be dismissed.
ORAL ARGUMENT; PUBLICATION OF OPINION
The state believes that the issues have been adequately
presented in the briefs and that oral argument would not aid in
the decision making process.

To the extent this Court reaches

10

Since this appeal was filed, the juvenile court has set
yet another hearing for petitioners to argue for custody.
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the issue of the purpose of a shelter hearing, the state believes
that a published opinion would be beneficial to clarify the
purpose of the shelter hearing.
CONCLUSION
Petitioners have asked this Court to provide them with
extraordinary relief by requiring the juvenile court to hold a
shelter hearing on the "removal" of C.K.

A shelter hearing is

not the appropriate type of hearing because the only reason to
hold a shelter hearing is to review the state's unilateral
decision to take a child into protective custody.

This never

occurred with respect to C.K.
All that petitioners are entitled to is that which they
have already received, a hearing during which their rights and
interests are considered.

The juvenile court went out of its way

to assure that petitioners were treated fairly and they were
given ample opportunity to have their position considered.

The

juvenile court determined that it would not be in C.K.'s best
interests to remain with either of petitioners and petitioners
have not shown that this determination was erroneous.
Accordingly the state respectfully requests that this petition be
dismissed.

_
DATED this „/ J

day of September, 1998
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
^

^

^

~

^ ^ J O H N PETERSON
Assistant Attorney General
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or district attorney's office shall coordinate with the attorney
general's office.
(2) Law enforcement personnel, Division of Child and Family Services personnel, the appointed guardian ad litem,
pretrial services personnel, and corrections personnel shall
make reasonable efforts to facilitate the coordination required
by this section.
(3) Members of interdisciplinary child protection teams,
established under Section 62A-4a-409, may participate in the
coordination required by this section.
1996

that have a primary objective of reuniting the family or, if
the parents neglect or refuse to comply with the terms and
conditions of the case plan, freeing the child for adoption.
1996

78-3a-404. Petition — Who may file.
(1) Any interested party, including a foster parent, may file
a petition for termination ofthe parent-child relationship with
regard to a child.
(2) The attorney general shall file a petition for termination
of parental rights under this part on behalf of the division.
1997

PART 3A

MINORS IN CUSTODY ON GROUNDS OTHER THAN
ABUSE OR NEGLECT
78-3a-350. Separate procedures for minors committed
to the Division of Child and Family Services
on grounds other than abuse or neglect.
(1) The processes and procedures described in Part 3,
Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings, designed to
meet the needs of minors who are abused or neglected, are not
applicable to a minor who is committed to the custody of the
Division of Child and Family Services on a basis other than
abuse or neglect and who are classified in the division's
management information system as having been placed in
custody primarily on the basis of delinquent behavior or a
status offense.
(2) The procedures described in Subsection 78-3a-119(2)(a)
are applicable to the minors described in Subsection (1).
(3) The court may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent
the interests of a minor described in Subsection (1).
1997
PART 4

78-3a-406

78-3a-405. Contents of petition.
(1) The petition for termination of parental rights shall
include, to the best information or belief of the petitioner:
(a) the name and place of residence of the petitioner;
(b) the name, sex, date and place of birth, and residence of the child;
(c) the relationship of the petitioner to the child;
(d) the names, addresses, and dates of birth of the
parents, if known;
(e) the name and address of the person having legal
custody or guardianship, or acting in loco parentis to the
child, or the organization or agency having legal custody
or providing care for the child;
(f) the grounds on which termination of parental rights
is sought, in accordance with Section 78-3a-407; and
(g) the names and addresses of the persons or the
authorized agency to whom legal custody or guardianship
of the child might be transferred.
(2) A copy of any relinquishment or consent, if any, previously executed by the parent or parents shall be attached to
the petition.
1994

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS ACT

78-3a-406. N o t i c e — N a t u r e of p r o c e e d i n g s .
(1) After a petition for termination of parental rights has
been filed, notice of that fact and of the time and place of the
hearing shall be provided, in accordance with the Utah Rules
R i g h t s Act."
1994
of Civil Procedure, to the parents, the guardian, the person or
78-3a-402. Judicial process for termination — Parent agency having legal custody of the child, and to any person
unfit or incompetent — Best interest of child. acting in loco parentis to the child.
(1) This part provides a judicial process for voluntary and
(2) A hearing shall be held specifically on the question of
involuntary severance of the parent-child relationship, determination of parental rights no sooner than ten days &1&er
signed to safeguard the rights and interests of all parties
service of summons is complete. A verbatim record of the
concerned and promote their welfare and that of the state.
proceedings shall be taken and the parties shall be advised of
(2) Wherever possible family life should be strengthened their right to counsel. The summons shall contain a statement
and preserved, but if a parent is found, by reason of his
to the effect that the rights of the parent or parents are
conduct or condition, to be unfit or incompetent based upon
proposed to be permanently terminated in the proceedings.
any ofthe grounds for termination described in this part, the
That statement may be contained in the summons originally
court shall then consider the welfare and best interest of the
issued in the proceeding or in a separate summons subsechild of paramount importance in determining whether termiquently issued.
nation of parental rights shall be ordered.
1994
(3) The proceedings are civil in nature and are governed by
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court shall in all cases
78-3a-403. Definitions.
require the petitioner to establish the facts by clear and
As used in this chapter:
convincing evidence, and shall give full and careful consider(1) "Division" means the Division of Child and Family
ation to all of the evidence presented with regard to the
Services within the Department of Human Services.
constitutional rights and claims ofthe parent and, if a parent
(2) "Failure of parental adjustment" means that a paris found, by reason of his conduct or condition, to be unfit or
ent or parents are unable or unwilling within a reasonincompetent based upon any of the grounds for termination
able time to substantially correct the circumstances, condescribed in this part, the court shall then consider the
duct, or conditions that led to placement of their child
outside of their home, notwithstanding reasonable and welfare and best interest ofthe child of paramount importance
in determining whether termination of parental rights shall
appropriate efforts made by the Division of Child and
be ordered.
Family Services to return the child to that home.
(4) Any hearing held pursuant to this part shall be held in
(3) "Plan" means a written agreement between the
closed court without admittance of any person who is not
parents of a child, who has been removed from his home
necessary
to the
action
or BYU.
proceeding, unless the court deterby the juvenile Digitized
court, and
theHoward
Division
of Child
and
by the
W. Hunter
Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark
Law
School,
holding the hearing in open court will not be
Family Services or written conditions
and obligations
Machine-generated
OCR, maymines
containthat
errors.
78-3a-401. Title.
This part shall be known as the "Termination of Parental
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78-3a-407

JUDICIAL CODE

78-3a-407. Grounds for termination of parental rights.
The court may terminate all parental rights with respect to
one or both parents if it finds any one of the following:
(1) that the parent or parents have abandoned the
child;
(2) that the parent or parents have neglected or abused
the child;
(3) that the parent or parents are unfit or incompetent;
(4) that the child is being cared for in an out-of-home
placement under the supervision of the court or the
division, that the division or other responsible agency has
made a diligent effort to provide appropriate services and
the parent has substantially neglected, wilfully refused,
or has been unable or unwilling to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home
placement, and there is a substantial likelihood that the
parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective parental care in the near future;
(5) failure of parental adjustment, as defined in this
chapter;
(6) that only token efforts have been made by the
parent or parents:
(a) to support or communicate with the child;
(b) to prevent neglect of the child;
(c) to eliminate the risk of serious physical, mental, or emotional abuse of the child; or
(d) to avoid being an unfit parent;
(7) the parent or parents have voluntarily relinquished
their parental rights to the child, and the court finds that
termination is in the child's best interest; or
(8) the parent or parents, after a period of trial during
which the child was returned to live in his own home,
substantially and continuously or repeatedly refused or
failed to give the child proper parental care and protection.
1994

434

(e) with regard to a child who is in the custody of the
division, if the parent is incarcerated as a result of
conviction of a felony, and the sentence is of such length
that the child will be deprived of a normal home for more
than one year; or
(f) a history of violent behavior.
(3) If a child has been placed in the custody of the division
and the parent or parents fail to comply substantially with the
terms and conditions of a plan within six months after the
date on which the child was placed or the plan was commenced, whichever occurs later, that failure to comply is
evidence of failure of parental adjustment.
(4) The following circumstances constitute prima facie evidence of unfitness:
(a) sexual abuse, injury, or death of a sibling of the
child due to known or substantiated abuse or neglect by
the parent or parents;
(b) conviction of a felony, if the facts of the crime are of
such a nature as to indicate the unfitness of the parent to
provide adequate care to the extent necessary for the
child's physical, mental, or emotional health and development; or
(c) a single incident of life-threatening or gravely disabling injury to or disfigurement of the child.
1997
78-3a-409.

Specific c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w h e r e child i s not

in physical custody of parent.
(1) If a child is not in the physical custody of the parent or
parents, the court, in determining whether parental rights
should be terminated shall consider, but is not limited to, the
following:
(a) the physical, mental, or emotional condition and
needs of the child and his desires regarding the termination, if the court determines he is of sufficient capacity to
express his desires; and
(b) the effort the parent or parents have made to adjust
their circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in
the child's best interest to return him to his home after a
reasonable length of time, including but not limited to:
(i) payment of a reasonable portion of substitute
physical care and maintenance, if financially able;
(ii) maintenance of regular visitation or other contact with the child that was designed and carried out
in a plan to reunite the child with the parent or
parents; and
(iii) maintenance of regular contact and communication with the custodian of the child.

78-3a-408. Evidence of grounds for termination.
(1) In determining whether a parent or parents have abandoned a child, it is prima facie evidence of abandonment that
the parent or parents:
(a) although having legal custody of the child, have
surrendered physical custody of the child, and for a period
of six months following the surrender have not manifested
to the child or to the person having the physical custody of
the child a firm intention to resume physical custody or to
make arrangements for the care of the child;
(b) have failed to communicate with the child by mail,
telephone, or otherwise for six months; or
(2) For purposes of this section, the court shall disregard
(c) failed to have shown the normal interest of a natu- incident**! conduct, contributions, contacts, and communicaral parent, without just cause.
tions.
1997
(2) In determining whether a parent or parents are unfit or
have neglected a child the court shall consider, but is not 78-3a-410. Specific c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w h e r e a c h i l d h a s
limited to, the following conditions:
b e e n p l a c e d i n foster h o m e .
(a) emotional illness, mental illness, or mental defiIf a child is in the custody of the division and has been
ciency of the parent that renders him unable to care for placed and resides in a foster home and the division institutes
the immediate and continuing physical or emotional proceedings under this p a r t regarding the child, with an
needs of the child for extended periods of time;
ultimate goal of having the child's foster parent or parents
(b) conduct toward a child of a physically, emotionally, adopt him, the court shall consider whether the child h a s
or sexually cruel or abusive nature;
become integrated into the foster family to the extent t h a t his
(c) habitual or excessive use of intoxicating liquors, familial identity is with t h a t family, and whether the foster
controlled substances, or dangerous drugs that render the family is able and willing permanently to treat the child as a
parent unable to care for the child;
member of t h e family. The court shall also consider, but is not
(d) repeated or continuous failure to provide the child limited to, t h e following:
with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education, or other
(1) the love, affection, and other emotional ties existing
care necessary for his physical, mental, and emotional
between the child and the parents, and the child's ties
health and development by a parent or parents who are
with the foster family;
capable of providing that care. However, a parent who,
(2) the capacity and disposition of the child's parents
legitimately practicing his religious beliefs, does not profrom whom the child was removed as compared with that
the Howardfor
W.aHunter
Law
J. Reuben Clark
School,
BYU.to give the child love, affection, and
vide specifiedDigitized
medicalbytreatment
child is
notLibrary,
for that
of theLaw
foster
family
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reason alone a negligent or unfit
parent;
guidance and to continue the education of the child:
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(3) the length of time the child has lived in a stable,
satisfactory foster home and the desirability of his continuing to live in that environment;
(4) the permanence as a family unit of the foster
family; and
(5) any other factor considered by the court to be
relevant to a particular placement of a child.
1984
78-3a-411.

Court d i s p o s i t i o n of child u p o n termina-

tion.
(1) Upon entry of an order under this part the court may:
(a) place the child in the legal custody and guardianship of a licensed child placement agency or the division
for adoption; or
(b) make any other disposition of the child authorized
under Section 78-3a-118.
(2) All adoptable children shall be placed for adoption.
1997
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78-3a-502

JUDICIAL CODE

78-3a-412. Review following termination.
(1) At the conclusion of the hearing in which the court
orders termination of the parent-child relationship, the court
shall order that a review hearing be held within 90 days
following the date of termination if the child has not been
permanently placed.
(2) At that review hearing, the agency or individual vested
with custody of the child shall report to the court regarding
the plan for permanent placement of the child. The guardian
ad litem shall submit to the court a written report with
recommendations, based on an independent investigation, for
disposition meeting the best interests of the child.

(5) Upon granting a voluntary relinquishment the court
may make orders relating to the child's care and welfare that
the court deems to be in the child's best interest.
1994
PART 5
DELINQUENCY A N D CRIMINAL ACTIONS
78-3a-501.

Criminal p r o c e e d i n g s i n v o l v i n g minors —
Transfer to j u v e n i l e c o u r t — Exception.

(1) If, during the pendency of a criminal or quasi-criminal
proceeding in another court, including a preliminary hearing,
it is determined that the person charged is under 21 years of
age and was less than 18 years of age at the time of committing the alleged offense, that court shall transfer the case to
the juvenile court, together with all the papers, documents,
and transcripts of any testimony except as provided in Sections 78-3a-602 and 78-3a-603.
(2) The court making the transfer shall order the person to
be taken immediately to the juvenile court or to a place of
detention designated by the juvenile court, or shall release
him to the custody of his parent or guardian or other person
legally responsible for him, to be brought before the juvenile
court at a time designated by it. The juvenile court shall then
proceed as provided in this chapter.
1996

78-3a-502. Petition — Preliminary inquiry — Nonjudicial adjustments — Formal referral — Citation — Failure to appear.
(1) Proceedings in minor's cases are commenced by petition.
(3) The court may order the agency or individual vested
(2) (a) A peace officer or any public official of the state, any
with custody of the child to report, at appropriate intervals, on
county, city, or town charged with the enforcement of the
the status of the child until the plan for permanent placement
laws of the state or local jurisdiction shall file a formal
of the child h a s been accomplished.
1994
referral with the juvenile court within ten days of the
minor's arrest. If the arrested minor is taken to a deten78-3a-413. Effect of d e c r e e .
tion facility, the formal referral shall be filed with the
<X) An order for the termination of the parent-child legal
juvenile court within 72 hours, excluding weekends and
relationship divests the child and the parents of all legal
holidays. There shall be no requirement to file a formal
rights, powers, immunities, duties, and obligations with rereferral with the juvenile court on an offense that would
spect to each other, except the right of the child to inherit from
be a class B misdemeanor or less if committed by an adult.
the parent.
(b) When the court is informed by a peace officer or
(2) An order or decree entered pursuant to this part may
other
person that a minor is or appears to be within the
not disentitle a child to any benefit due him from any third
court's jurisdiction, the probation department shall make
person, including, but not limited to, any Indian tribe, agency,
a preliminary inquiry to determine whether the interests
state, or the United States.
of the public or of the minor require that further action be
(3) After the termination of a parent-child legal relationtaken.
ship, the former parent is neither entitled to any notice of
(c) Based on the preliminary inquiry, the court may
proceedings for the adoption of the child nor has any right to
authorize the filing of or request that the county attorney
object to the adoption or to participate in any other placement
or district attorney as provided under Sections 17-18-1
proceedings.
1994
and 17-18-1.7 file a petition. In its discretion, the court
78-3a-414. Voluntary r e l i n q u i s h m e n t — Irrevocable.
may, through its probation department, enter into a
(1) Voluntary relinquishment or consent for termination of
written consent agreement with the minor and the miparental rights shall be signed or confirmed under oath before
nor's parent, guardian, or custodian for the nonjudicial
a judge of any court that has jurisdiction over proceedings for
adjustment of the case if the facts are admitted and
termination of parental rights in this state or any other state,
establish prima facie jurisdiction. Efforts to effect a nonor a public officer appointed by that court for the purpose of
judicial adjustment may not extend for a period of more
taking consents or relinquishments.
than two months without leave of a judge of the court,
(2) The court or appointed officer shall certify that the
who may extend the period for an additional two months.
person executing the consent or relinquishment has read and
The probation department may not in connection with
understands the consent or relinquishment and has signed it
any nonjudicial adjustment compel any person to appear
freely and voluntarily.
at any conference, produce any papers, or visit any place.
(3) A voluntary relinquishment or consent for termination
(d) The nonjudicial adjustment of a case may include
of parental rights is effective when it is signed and may not be
conditions agreed upon as part of the nonjudicial closure:
revoked.
(i) payment of a financial penalty of not more than
$100 to the Juvenile Court;
(4) The requirements and processes described in Sections
78-3a-402 through 78-3a-410 do not apply to a voluntary
(ii) payment of victim restitution;
relinquishment or consent for termination of parental rights.
(iii) satisfactory completion of community service;
The court need only find t h a t the relinquishment or termina(iv) referral to an appropriate provider for counseltion is in the child's Digitized
best interest.
ing or
treatment;
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark
Law
School, BYU.
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Notice — Nature of proceedings.
Grounds for termination of parental rights.
Evidence of grounds for termination.
Specific considerations where child is not in
physical custody of parent.
Specific considerations where a child has been
placed in foster home.
Court disposition of child upon termination.
Review following termination.
Effect of decree.
Voluntary relinquishment — Irrevocable.
Part 5

Delinquency and Criminal Actions
Criminal proceedings involving minors —
Transfer to juvenile court — Exception.
78-3*i-502.
Petition — Preliminary inquiry — Nonjudicial
adjustments — Formal referral — Citation
— Failure to appear.
78-3a- 503.
Citation procedure — Citation — Offenses —
Time limits — Failure to appear.
78-3a- 504.
Minor held in detention — Credit for good
behavior.
78-3a 505.
Dispositional report required in minor's cases
— Exceptions.
78-3a 506.
Suspension of license for certain offenses.
78-3a 507 to 78-3a-521. Renumbered as §§ 78-3a-112 to 78-3a121, 78-3a-913, 78-3a-914.
Part 6
Transfer of Jurisdiction

78-3a-801.

Jurisdiction of district court.
Serious youth offender — Procedure.
Certification hearings — Juvenile court to hold
preliminary hearing — Factors considered
by juvenile court for waiver of jurisdiction to
district court.

nors — Proof of delinquency not required for
conviction.
^
Penalty — Fines — Suspension of sentence on
condition — Bond.
Practice and procedure — Jury trial — Criminal Code prosecution unaffected.
»
Costs and expenses of trial.
Part9
Miscellaneous Provisions

•*\
78-3a-901.
78-3a-902.
78-3a-903.
78-3a-904.
78-3a-905.
78-3a-906.

78-3a-907.
78-3a-908.
78-3a-909.
78-3a-910.
78-3a-911.
78-3a-912.

78-3a-r501

78-3a-601.
78-3a-602.
78-3a-603.

414.

78-3a-913.

78-3a-914.

Violation of order of court — Contempt —"
Penalty.
•*"
Amendment of petition — When authorized —
Continuance of proceedings.
^
Modification or termination of custody order or
decree — Grounds — Procedure.
When photographs, fingerprints, or HTV infection tests may be taken — Distribution —
Expungement.
Expungement of juvenile court record —- Petition — Procedure.
Support and expenses of minor in custody of
individual or institution — Order for payment by parent or other person authorized
— Payments to nongovernmental agency
vested with legal custody.
Transfer of continuing jurisdiction to other
district.
New hearings authorized — Grounds and procedure.
Appeals.
Cooperation of political subdivisions and public or private agencies and organizations.
Office of Guardian Ad Litem Director.
Appointment of attorney guardian ad litem —
Duties and responsibilities — Training —
Trained staff and court appointed special
advocate volunteers — Costs — Immunity.
Right to counsel — Appointment of counsel for
indigent — Cost — Court hearing to determine compelling reason to appoint a
noncontracting attorney — Rate of pay.
Exchange of information with agency or institution having legal custody — Transfer of
minor to state prison or other adult facility
prohibited.
-...«*
PARTI
GENERAL PROVISIONS

78-3a-l to 78-3a-65. Repealed.

;,

' 1996

78-3a-101. Title.
This chapter is known as the "Juvenile Court Act of 1996."
1996

78-3a-102. Establishment of juvenile court — Organization and status of court — Purpose.
(1) There is established for the state a juvenile court.
(2) The juvenile court is a court of record. It shall have a
seal, and its judges, clerks, and referees have the power to
administer oaths and affirmations.
Part 8
(3) The juvenile court is of equal status with the district
courts
of Law
the state.
Adult
Offenses
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark
School, BYU.
The juvenile court is established as a forum for the
Machine-generated OCR, may contain(4)
errors.
Jurisdiction of adults for offenses acrainst miresolution of all matters properly brought before it, consistent
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with applicable constitutional and statutory requirements of
due process.
(5) The purpose of the court under this chapter is to:
(a) promote public safety and individual accountability
by the imposition of appropriate sanctions on persons who
have committed acts in violation of law;
(b) order appropriate measures to promote guidance
and control, preferably in the minor's own home, as an aid
in the prevention of future unlawful conduct and the
development of responsible citizenship;
(c) where appropriate, order rehabilitation, reeducation, and treatment for persons who have committed acts
bringing them within the court's jurisdiction;
(d) adjudicate matters that relate to minors who are
beyond parental or adult control and to establish appropriate authority over these minors by means of placement
and control orders;
(e) adjudicate matters that relate to abused, neglected,
and dependent minors and to provide care and protection
for these minors by placement, protection, and custody
orders;
(f) remove a minor from parental custody only where
the minor's safety or welfare, or the public safety, may not
otherwise be adequately safeguarded; and
(g) consistent with the ends of justice, strive to act in
the best interests of the minor's in all cases and attempt
to preserve and strengthen family ties where possible.

78-3a-103

minor is or appears to be within the court's jurisdictio^and that a petition may be filed.
(1) "Group rehabilitation therapy" means psychological
and social counseling of one or more persons in the group,
depending upon the recommendation of the therapist.
(m) "Guardianship of the person" includes the authority to consent to marriage, to enlistment in the armed
forces, to major medical, surgical, or psychiatric treatment, and to legal custody, illegal custody is not vested in
another person, agency, or institution.
(n) "Legal custody" means a relationship embodying
the following rights and duties:
(i) the right to physical custody of the minor;
(ii) the right and duty to protect, train, and discipline the minor;
(iii) the duty to provide the minor with food, clothing, shelter, education, and ordinary medical care;
(iv) the right to determine where and with whom
the minor shall live; and
(v) the right, in an emergency, to authorize surgery
or other extraordinary care,
(o) "Minor" means a person under the age of 18 years.
It includes the term "child" as used in other parts of this
chapter.
(p) "Natural parent" means a minor's biological or
adoptive parent, and includes the minor's noncustodial
parent.
1997
(q) (i) "Neglected child" means a minor:
78-3a-103. Definitions.
(A) whose parent, guardian, or custodian has
(1) As used in this chapter:
abandoned or subjected the minor to mistreat(a) "Abused child" includes a minor less than 18 years
ment or abuse;
'of age who has suffered or been threatened with
(B) who lacks proper parental care by reason
nonaccidental physical or mental harm, negligent treatof the fault or habits of the parent, guardian, or
ment, sexual exploitation, or who has been the victim of
custodian;
any sexual abuse.
(C) whose parent, guardian, or custodian fails
(b) "Adjudication" means a finding by the court, incoror refuses to provide proper or necessary subsisporated in a decree, that the facts alleged in the petition
tence, education, or medical care, including surhave been proved.
gery or psychiatric services when required, or
(c) "Adult" means a person 18 years of age or over,
any other care necessary for health, safety, morexcept that persons 18 years or over under the continuing
als, or well-being; or
jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to Section
(D) who is at risk of being a neglected or
78-3a-121 shall be referred to as minors.
abused child as defined in this chapter because
another minor in the same home is a neglected or
(d) "Board" means the Board of Juvenile Court Judges.
abused child as defined in this chapter.
(e) "Child placement agency" means:
(ii) The aspect of neglect related to education,
(i) a private agency licensed to receive minors for
described in Subsection (lXqXiXC), means that, after
placement or adoption under this code; or
receiving notice that a minor has been frequently
(ii) a private agency receiving minors for placeabsent from school without good cause, or that the
ment or adoption in another state, which agency is
minor has failed to cooperate with school authorities
licensed or approved where such license or approval
in a reasonable manner, a parent or guardian fails to
is required by law.
make a good faith effort to ensure that the minor
(f) "Commit" means to transfer legal custody.
receives an appropriate education.
(g) "Court" means the juvenile court.
(iii) A parent or guardian legitimately practicing
(h) "Dependent child" includes a minor who is homeless
religious beliefs and who, for that reason, does not
or without proper care through no fault of his parent,
provide specified medical treatment for a minor, is
guardian, or custodian.
not guilty of neglect,
(i) "Deprivation of custody* means transfer of legal
(r) "Nonjudicial adjustment" means closure of the case
custody by the court from a parent or the parents or a
by the assigned probation officer without judicial deterprevious legal custodian to another person, agency, or
mination upon the consent in writing of the minor, the
institution.
parent, legal guardian or custodian, and the assigned
(j) "Detention" means home detention and secure deprobation officer.
tention as defined in Section 62A-7-101 for the temporary
(s) "Probation" means a legal status created by court
care of minors who require secure custody in physically
order following an adjudication on the ground of a violarestricting facilities:
tion of law or under Section 78-3a-104, whereby the minor
(i) pending court disposition or transfer to another
is permitted to remain in his home under prescribed
jurisdiction; or
conditions and under supervision by the probation depart(ii) while under the continuing jurisdiction of the
ment or other agency designated by the court, subject to
court.
the Howard
W. Hunter
J. Reuben
Clark
Lawfor
School,
BYU.of any of the conditions
return
to the
court
violation
(k) "Formal referral" Digitized
means abywritten
report
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a Library,
Machine-generated
contain errors.
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(c) a minor who is abused, neglected, or dependent, as
those terms are defined in Section 78-3a-103;
(d) the determination of the custody of a minor or to
appoint a guardian of the person or other guardian of a
minor who comes within the court's jurisdiction under
other provisions of this section;
(e) the termination of the legal parent-child relationship in accordance with Part 4, Termination of Parental
Rights Act, including termination of residual parental
rights and duties;
(f) the treatment or commitment of a mentally retarded minor;
(g) a minor who, in defiance of earnest and persistent
efforts on the part of his parents and school authorities as
required under Section 53A-11-103, is a habitual truant
from school;
(h) the judicial consent to the marriage of a minor
under age 16 upon a determination of voluntariness or
where otherwise required by law, employment, or enlistment of a minor when consent is required by law;
(i) any parent or parents of a minor committed to a
secure youth corrections facility, to order, at the discretion
of the court and on the recommendation of a secure youth
corrections facility, the parent or parents of a minor
committed to a secure youth corrections facility for a
custodial term, to undergo group rehabilitation therapy
under the direction of a secure youth corrections facility
therapist, who has supervision of that "parent's or parents'
minor, or any other therapist the court may direct, for a
period directed by the court as recommended by a secure
youth corrections facility;
(j) a minor under Title 55, Chapter 12, Interstate
Compact on Juveniles;
(k) the treatment or commitment of a mentally ill child.
The court may commit a child to the physical custody of a
local mental health authority or to the legal custody of the
Division of Mental Health in accordance with the procedures and requirements of Title 62A, Chapter 12, Part 2A,
Commitment of Persons Under Age 18 to Division of
Mental Health. The court may not commit a child directly
to the Utah State Hospital; and
(1) the commitment of a minor in accordance with
Section 62A-8-501.
(2) In addition to the provisions of Subsection (lXa) the
juvenile court h a s exclusive jurisdiction over any traffic offense committed by a minor under 1§ years of age and
concurrent jurisdiction over all other traffic offenses committed by a minor 16 years of age or older, except that the court
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the following traffic
offenses committed by a minor under 18 years of age:
(a) Section 76-5-207, automobile homicide;
(b) Section 41-6-44, operating a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or drugs;
(c) Section 41-6-45, reckless driving;
(d) Section 41-la-1311, unauthorized control over a
78-3a-104. J u r i s d i c t i o n of j u v e n i l e c o u r t — Original —
motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer;
Exclusive.
(e) Section 41-la-1314, unauthorized control over a
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, t h e juvenile court
motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer for an extended
has exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings concerning:
period of time; and
(a) a minor who has violated any federal, state, or local
law or municipal ordinance or a person younger t h a n 21
(f) Section 41-6-13.5, fleeing a peace officer.
years of age who h a s violated any law or ordinance before
(3) The court also h a s jurisdiction over traffic offenses t h a t
becoming 18 years of age, regardless of where the violaare part of a single criminal episode filed in a petition t h a t
tion occurred, excluding traffic laws and ordinances;
contains an offense over which the court has jurisdiction.
(b) a person 21 years of age or older who has failed or
(4) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over questions of
refused to comply with an order of the juvenile court to
custody, support, and visitation certified to it by the district
pay a fine or restitution, if the order was imposed prior to
court pursuant to Section 78-3a-105.
the person's 21st Digitized
birthday;byhowever,
the
(5) TheClark
juvenile
court has
jurisdiction over an ungovernable
the Howard
W.continuing
Hunter LawjurisLibrary, J. Reuben
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diction is limited to causing compliance
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runaway
minor who is referred to it by the Division of Child
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orders;
and Familv Services or bv Dublic or Drivate agencies that
~4£» (t) "Protective supervision" means a legal status cre* ated by court order following an adjudication on the
ground of abuse, neglect, or dependency, whereby the
minor is permitted to remain in his home, and supervision
and assistance to correct the abuse, neglect, or dependency is provided by the probation department or other
agency designated by the court.
(u) "Residual parental rights and duties* means those
rights and duties remaining with the parent after legal
custody or guardianship, or both, have been vested in
another person or agency, including the responsibility for
support, the right to consent to adoption, the right to
determine the child's religious affiliation, and the right to
reasonable visitation unless restricted by the court. If no
guardian has been appointed, "residual parental rights
and duties" also include the right to consent to marriage,
to enlistment, and to major medical, surgical, or psychiatric treatment.
(v) "Secure facility" means any facility operated by or
under contract with the Division of Youth Corrections,
that provides 24-hour supervision and confinement for
youth offenders committed to the division for custody and
rehabilitation.
(w) "Shelter" means the temporary care of minors in
physically unrestricted facilities pending court disposition or transfer to another jurisdiction.
(x) "Termination of parental rights" means the permanent elimination of all parental rights and duties, including residual parental rights and duties, by court order.
(y) T h e r a p i s t " means a person employed by a state
division or agency for the purpose of conducting psychological treatment and counseling of a minor in its custody,
or any other person licensed or approved by the state for
the purpose of conducting psychological treatment and
counseling.
(2) As used in Part 3, Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency
Proceedings, with regard to the Division of Child and Family
Services:
(a) "Custody" means the custody of a minor in the
Division of Child and Family Services as of the date of
disposition.
(b) "Protective custody" means the shelter of a minor by
the Division of Child and Family Services from the time
the minor is removed from home until the shelter hearing,
or the minor's return home, whichever occurs earlier.
(c) "Temporary custody" means the custody of a minor
in the Division of Child and Family Services from the date
of the shelter hearing until disposition.
(3) In determining whether a minor is neglected or abused,
as defined in this section, it may be presumed t h a t the person
having the minor under his direct and exclusive care and
control at the time of the abuse is responsible for the neglect
or abuse.
1997
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contract with the division to provide services to that minor
where, despite earnest and persistent efforts by the division or
agency, the minor has demonstrated that he:
(a) is beyond the control of his parent, guardian, lawful
custodian, or school authorities to the extent that his
behavior or condition endangers his own welfare or the
welfare of others; or
(b) has run away from home.
(6) This section does not restrict the right of access to the
juvenile court by private agencies or other persons.
(7) The juvenile court has jurisdiction of ail magistrate
functions relative to cases arising under Section 78-3a-602.
1997

78-3a-105. Concurrent jurisdiction — District court
and juvenile court.
(1) The district court or other court has concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile court as follows:
(a) when a person who is 18 years of age or older and
who is under the continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile
court under Section 78-3a-118 violates any federal, state,
or local law or municipal ordinance; and
(b) in adoption proceedings, when the juvenile court
has previously entered an order terminating the rights of
a parent, and finds that adoption is in the best interest of
the minor. Adoption proceedings under this section shall
be conducted in accordance with the procedures described
in Title 78, Chapter 30, Adoption.
(2) The juvenile court has jurisdiction over petitions to
modify a minor's birth certificate if the court otherwise has
jurisdiction over the minor.
(3) (a) This section does not deprive the district court of
jurisdiction to appoint a guardian for a minor, or to
determine the support, custody, and visitation of a minor
upon writ of habeas corpus or when the question of
support, custody, and visitation is incidental to the determination of a cause in the district court.
(b) However, if a petition involving the same minor is
pending in the juvenile court or the juvenile court has
previously acquired continuing jurisdiction over the same
minor, the district court shall certify the question of
support, custody, and visitation to the juvenile court for
determination.
(4) When a question is certified to the juvenile court under
Subsection (3), the findings and order of the juvenile court
judge are the order of the district court.
(5) (a) Where a support, custody, or visitation award has
been made by a district court in a divorce action or other
proceeding, and the jurisdiction of the district court in the
case is continuing, the juvenile court may acquire jurisdiction in a case involving the same minor if the minor is
dependent, abused, neglected, or otherwise comes within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Section 78-3a104.
(b) The juvenile court may, by order, change the custody, support, and visitation rights previously ordered in
the district court as necessary to implement the order of
the juvenile court for the safety and welfare of the minor.
The juvenile court order remains in effect so long as the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court continues.
(6) When a copy of the findings and order of the juvenile
court has been filed with the district court, the findings and
order of the juvenile court are binding on the parties to the
divorce action as though entered in the district court.
1997

78-3a-109

the same purposes, in the same manner and pursuant to the
same procedures set forth in the code of criminal procedure for
the issuance of search warrants, subpoenas, or investigative
subpoenas in other trial courts in the state.
(2) (a) If it appears to the court upon an affidavit sworn to
by a peace officer or any other person, and upon the
examination of other witnesses, if required by the judge,
that there is probable cause to believe that a child is being
ill-treated by his parent, guardian, or custodian, or is
being detained, ill-treated, or harbored against the desires of his parent, guardian, or custodian, in any place
within the jurisdiction of the court, the court may issue a
warrant authorizing a peace officer to search for the child.
(b) The officer making the search may enter a house or
premises by force, if necessary, in order to remove the
child.
(c) The officer shall then take the child to the place of
shelter designated by the court.
1997
78-3a-107. Judges of juvenile court — Appointments —
Terms.
(1) Judges of the juvenile court shall be appointed initially
to serve until the first general election held more than three
years after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter,
the term of office of a judge of a juvenile court is six years and
commences on the first Monday in January next following the
date of election.
(2) A judge whose term expires may serve, upon request of
the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed and
qualified.

1996

78-3a-108. Sessions of juvenile court.
(1) In each county, regular juvenile court sessions shall be
held at a place designated by the judge or judges of the
juvenile court district, with the approval of the board.
(2) Court sessions shall be held in each county when the
presiding judge of the juvenile court directs, except that a
judge of the district may hold court in any county within the
district at any time, if required by the urgency of the case.
1996

7&.$e»109„ Title of petition mnd other court documents
— Form and contents of petition — Order for
temporary custody — Physical or psychological examination of minor, parent, or guardian
— Dismissal of petition.
(1) The petition and all subsequent court documents in the
proceeding shall be entitled:
"State of Utah, in the interest of.
, a person under
18 years of age (or a person under 21 years of age)."
(2) The petition shall be verified and statements in the
petition may be made upon information and belief.
(3) The petition shall be written in simple and brief language and include the facts which bring the minor within the
jurisdiction of the court, as provided in Section 78-3a-104.
(4) The petition shall further state:
(a) the name, age, and residence of the minor;
(b) the names and residences of the minor's parents;
(c) the name and residence of the guardian, if there is
one;
(d) the name and address of the nearest known relative, if no parent or guardian is known; and
(e) the name and residence of the person having physical custody of the minor. If any of the facts required are
not known by the petitioner, the petition shall so state.
78-3a-106. Search warrants and subpoenas — Author(5) At any time after a petition is filed, the court may make
ity to issue.
(1) The court has authority to issue search warrants, sub- an order providing for temporary custody of the minor.
(6) The court may order that a minor concerning whom a
poenas, or investigative subpoenas in criminal cases, delinpetition has been filed shall be examined by a physician,
quency, and abuse, neglect,
and
dependency
proceedings
for
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and may place the minor
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PERRI ANN BABALIS - #5658
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM-'#1231
Attorney General
Attorneys for the State of Utah
160 East 300 South - 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 366-0250

£r: G P ( ICQ",
:yt District
j,. l0 .iii- Court

IN AND FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of
ORTIZ, Samantha
ORTIZ, Jay
KOFOD, Cori

MOTION FOR REVIEW
HEARING AND ORDER
Case No. 918244
918245
920469

02/28/92
04/23/93
04/08/96

Children under eighteen years of age

Judge Beherns

MOTION
COMES NOW the State of Utah, Division of Child and Family Services, by and through
its attorney, Perri Ann Babalis, Assistant Attorney General, and hereby motions the Court to hold
a review hearing in this matter, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3a-307(6), to
review whether Cori's placement with her relative continues to be in the best interest of the child.
Specifically, the State has been informed that Cori's parents, Chastity Ortiz and Johnny Kofod,
are currently residing in the same home with Cori and her aunt, Val Kofod.
This matter will be heard on Thursday, September 18,1997 at 3:00 p.m. before Judge
Behrens, 210 West 10000 South, Sandy, Utah.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DATED this

zd-day of September, 1997.
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL

*lMl

L*LL
PERRI ANN BABALIS
Assistant Attorney General
cc: Kristin Fadel, GAL
Tina Porter, DCFS
Lisa Lokken, Laherty & Assoc.
Rilling & Assoc.
Val Kofod, Aunt
1043 E. Buddlea, Sandy, UT 84094
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PERRI ANN BABAL1S - #565S
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM -'#1231
Attorney General
Attorneys for the State of Utah
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 366-0250

3rd District
Jwwiita Vom

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH in the interest of,
ORTIZ, SAMANTHA
ORTIZ, JAY
KOFOD,CORI

DOB 2/28/92
DOB 4/23/93
DOB 4/8/96

Persons under eighteen (18) years of age.

AMENDED ORDER RE:
PERMANENCY PLAN,
AND PLACEMENT OF
CORI
Case No. 918244,918245
920469
Judge Behrens

The matters the State's Motion for a Permanency Plan Hearing, and the State's
Motion to Review Placement, came on before the Court on October 24, 1997, before
Judge Charles D. Behrens. Those present were Perri Ann Babalis, Assistant Attorney
General; Kristin Fadel, Guardian Ad Litem; Tina Porter and Dorothy Pendleton, Division
of Child and Family Services; Lisa Lokken, Attorney for Parents; Parents; Grandmother;
Aunt; Josh Biesinger, therapist.
I. State's Motion for Permanency Plan Hearing.
The court received a court report from Tina Porter, Division of Child and Family
Services, dated October 22, 1997. The court also received a court report from the
Guardian Ad Litem, dated September 19, 1997.
The court heard comments from the parties. Ms. Lokken then called the
following witnesses, for purposes of cross-examination:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1. Tina Porter, Division of Child and Family Services.
2. Josh Biesinger, Children's Therapist.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court made the following findings and order:
1. The court finds that the parents understood what was required of them with
regards to the service plans. This is supported by the fact that the parents
made some initial progress on the specifics of the service plans.
2. The court finds that the Division of Child and Family Services has offered
reasonable services to the family.
3. The court finds that the parents have partially complied with the service plans,
but have failed to comply in some major aspects.
4. The court finds that prima facie evidence exists that the children are at risk to
return to the care and custody of their parents.
5. The court orders that reunification services shall be terminated.
6. The court orders the goal be changed to adoption.
7. The court orders that visitation between the mother and Samantha and Jay
shall be terminated.
8. The court orders that visitation between the parents and Cori shall be
supervised and at the discretion of the Division of Child and Family Services.
9. A pre-trial on the State's Petition to Terminate Parental Rights shall be held
on November 21, 1997 at 1:30 p.m.
II.

State's Motion to Review Placement.
The State filed a Motion to Review Placement pursuant to Utah Code Annotated,

Section 78-3a-307(6).
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The court heard comments from the parties.
Based upon the foregoing, the court made the following findings and order:
1. It is in the best interest of Cori to be removed from the kinship placement, Val
Newman a.k.a. Kofod, and placed in the custody and guardianship of the
Division of Child and Family Services.
2. Val Newman has thirty (30) days to come forward with counsel and address
the issue further, if so desired.
3. If Val Newman fails to come forward within thirty days, Cori's placement
shall become an adoptive placement.
DATED this r9Q

of November, 1997.
BY THE COURT:

CHARLESD
Juvenile Cou
CC: Tina Porter and Dorothy Pendleton, DCFS
Kristin Fadel, GAL
Lisa Lokken, Laherty & Assoc.
Val Newman, Aunt
1043 E. Buddlea, Sandy, UT 84094
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f
Dear J u d g e B e h r e n s ;

|sj(|y ^

Your h o n o r , I f m filing for custody of Cori May K o f o d .
§V £ n
Cori came to live w i t h us in S e p t . of 9 6 , and w e love her
jf/• V
d e a r l y . W e have w o r k e d w i t h C o r i , and h a v e spent a l o t of
time w i t h h e r . W e h a v e been told m a n y times that she is m o r e
a d v a n c e then o t h e r 1| o l d s , and that it is easy to see t h a t
she gets plenty of love and a t t e n t i o n . C o r i has h e r own r o o m ,
m a n y t o y s to play w i t h , she has a p u p p y and some f i s h , a big
fenced yard to p l a y i n , and a little friend w h o lives n e x t
d o o r . C o r i is fed a h e a l t h y d i e t , our T.V. stays on t h e Disney
c h a n n e l all d a y , u n l e s s B a r n e y is o n . My d a u g h t e r t a k e s h e r
to the park 2-4 t i m e s a w k . , C o r i is sang to at b e d t i m e and
read to at nap t i m e .
Y o u r Honor w e are good p e o p l e , and a very loving and caring
family.
O u r family d o c t o r has included
a l e t t e r , he said he w o u l d
be glad to go to c o u r t for m e to testify that C o r i is w e l l
taken care of and h a p p y .
T i n a P o r t e r , t h e D C F S w o r k e r a l s o said she w i l l go to c o u r t
on my b e h a l f , She saw Cori a l m o s t w e e k l y . Tina said she w o u l d
t e s t i f y that Cori w a s always h a p p y , healthy and c l e a n , and
the h o u s e was a l w a y s p l e a s e n t and c l e a n . Tina s a y s , she can
not imagine C o r i w i t h a n y o n e but m e .

I know you dont know me, all you know is what you were
told, and you were looking out for the best interest o£
Cori. But were you told that my husband, Danny Newman, has
no\ seen Samantha Ortiz for over two years, and that they
have never been alone. That in the three years we have krvcw'n
her that my husband has been around Samantha 3-4 hrs..
Did anyone tell you, that after Su7.y Bo£worth,the DCFS investigater ^&V& to my husband, she closed the case unfounded,
and said that Samantha was very unreliable.
Were you told she i Samantha has also accused her step-dad,
her uncle, and her foster dad.
1 do not know Samantha well, but I do care for her and I
believe something has happened to her, but I do not know what.
1 do know she has an active imagination, and sometimes its
hard to know if she is telling what really happened or telling
stories. After a visit with Samantha last Thanksgiving, Samantha
told her foster mom that her parents had sex on the table
while putting up Christmas lights. During a visit right befor
Christmas , when Samantha saw her foster mom coming, she hid
and started crying, she said that her daddy Donnie was mean
to her and that he hurts her. At this time she did have a
burn on her hand, we told Tina. Later we were told Samantha
was fine and she Y\ad hurt herself on exercise equipment.
Recently Samantha was checked by another docter and he said
there is no signs of sexual abuse.
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I do not know what I should say, what I should do, or even
whet happens next. I've talked to a couple of lawyers, who
assured me I would get Cori back, but they want 2000.00 to
2500.00 as a retainer, and I do not have that kind of money.
I called the courthouse, they told me, that I can file a
pleading, and for custody of Cori on my own, that X had to
state why Cori should be with me.
WHY CORI SHOULD BE WITH ME; To begin with we are the only
family and home she has ever known. I love her like she is my
own daughter, I would never let anyone harm her. We have a
good, loving, safe, and stable home for Cori.
We went to our first visit on Oct. 30thf Cori was sad,
whiney, and did not want to be held. Even Tina, the caseworker,
commented on how different she seemed. It was affecting my
sweet and loving Cori already, Cori needs to come home. We
have had another visit the following wk., when the visit was
over and they had to take Cori again, she cried and held her
little CXCCVS out to me. I'm affraid I'm going to lose her trust.
Your Honor I know you have alot of bad situations you have
to deal with daily, and you have to make sure you are making
the right choices, Cori home with her family is the right choice.
I dont know what I need to do, but I will do anything
you ask. I dont want to lose any more time, or have Cori
become more confused, I just want her to come home.
I will give her parents limited, supervised visits, or I
wont let them see Cori at all if thats what you want.
I am in hopes that this and the letters I have submitted to
you, have put ease to any doubts or concerns you may have had
about placing Cori with me. But if for some reason you are
still worried, then why cant Cori be placed with her grandmother, Ruth Kofod,. My mom has worked with children alot,
and has also included a couple of letters from people who
know her.
Cori is a very loved and wanted little girl, with two happy,
stable homes §V\e can go to. So I beg of you to please hear
us and let Cori come home to her family.

THANKS FOR YOUR TIME.
'Xv c^o-v ^'-- ; -

u,v

~^ ^ ^ A ' v o u s ,
JLusyr^
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FILED
PERRl ANN BABALIS - #5658
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM -'#1231
Attorney General
Attorneys for the State of Utah
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 366-0250
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3rd District
Juvenile Cowt

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH in the interest of,

:

ORTIZ, SAMANTHA
ORTIZ, JAY
KOFOD, CORJ

:

DOB 2/28/92
DOB 4/23/93
DOB 4/8/96

Persons under eighteen (18) years of age.

ORDER RE: PLACEMENT
OF CORI

Case No. 918244,918245
920469
Judge Behrens

The matter of a hearing regarding the placement of Cori Kofod came on before
the Court on February 13, 1998, before Judge Charles D. Behrens. Those present were
Perri Ann Babalis, Assistant Attorney General; Kristin Fadel, Guardian Ad Litem; Tina
Porter, Dorothy Pendleton, Brad Cook and Dave Andreason, Division of Child and
Family Services; Ross Nakashima, Attorney for Val and Danny Newman, Val Newman,
Aunt; Lisa Lokken, Attorney for Mother and John Kofod, Mother, John Kofod,
Grandmother.
Mr. Nakashima motioned the court for a continuance of the matter on the ground
that the court should hold a shelter hearing with regards to the removal of Cori from the
placement with her aunt and uncle.
The court heard argument from counsel concerning Mr. Nakashima's motion.
Based upon the above, the court made the following findings and order:
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1. The court regards Cori's placement with Val and Danny Newman as a kinship
placement pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3a-307(5).
2.

The court finds that pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-3a-307(6),
the court shall periodically review the kinship placement to determine whether
the placement with the relatives continues to be in the child's best interest,
whether the child should return home, or whether the child should be placed in
the custody of the division.

3. The court finds that a shelter hearing is not required under the present
circumstances.
4. Motion for continuance is denied.
The court having denied Mr. Nakashima's motion for continuance, the matter
before the court is whether the child is safe to return to the Newman home.
The court received and accepted the following documents:
1. Child Protective Services Kinship Care Report prepared by Brad Cook, dated
February 6, 1998.
2. Accepted Referral Form 741 and CPS information prepared by Dave
Andreason, dated January 2, 1998.
3. Court Report prepared by Tina Porter, dated February 10, 1998.
4. 30 Day Mental Health Assessment prepared by Gail Hunt, Ph.D., dated
February 4, 1998.
The court heard argument from counsel.
Based upon the foregoing, the court made the following findings and order:
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1. Based upon the information provided to the court, the court denies the
Newman's motion.
2. Ttie courtfindsthat it is in the best interest of Cori to not return to the
Newman home.
3. Ail previous orders shall remain in effect.
DATED this Ifl ofFebruary 1998.
BY THE COURT:

CHARLES b . BE
Juvenile Court Judge \ f e v
CC: Tina Porteriuad Dorothy Pendleton, DCFS
Kxistin^Eadel,^GAL
Lisa Lokkfia,_La&ei2y^& Assoc.
Ross Nakashima, Attorney for Newmans

COV^v'V/

''Xi,^J,,»>*x
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APR ) 8 1990
TONI MARIE SUTLIFF - #4155
Attorney for Petitioners
1631 South 800 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
Telephone: (801)817-4191
Facsimile: (801) 817-8036

^ v•

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

Val Newman and Ruth Kofod,
Petitioners,

PETITION
FOR
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF

v.

)
)
)
)

Hon. Charles D. Behrens, Judge
Third District Juvenile Court,
and
State of Utah, Division of Child and
Family Services,
Respondents

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.

COME NOW Val Newman and Ruth Kofod, Petitioners, by and through
their counsel, Toni Marie Sutliff, and pursuant to Rule 19, Rules of Appellate
Procedure, and Rule 65B(d&e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, submit this
Petition for Extraordinary Relief to require the juvenile court and the State of
Utah, Division of Family Services (DCFS) to provide a shelter hearing as required
by Utah law, and to stay the adoption proceedings of the minor, C.K. until such
shelter hearing is held.
In support of this Petition, Petitioners allege as follows:
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A. Parties Affected by Action
The individuals or associations whose interests might be substantially
affected by this action are:
1. C.K., a minor child
2. Val Newman, C.K/s paternal aunt
3. Ruth Kofod, C.K/s paternal grandmother
4. State of Utah, Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS)
B. Statement of Issues Presented
1. Did the DCFS violate the provisions of Utah Code Ann. sec. 78-3a-301,
by removing the minor, C.K., from the custody of her legal guardian,
Petitioner, Val Newman, without substantial cause?
2. Did the DCFS violate Petitioners' due process rights as C.K/s legal
guardians by failing to comply with the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
sec. 78-3a-306 which requires that a shelter hearing be held within 72
hours after removal of a child from its home to substantiate the need to
continue the child's removal?
3. Did the juvenile court trial judge fail to comply with his judicial duties
when he allowed the DCFS to remove C.K. from her legal guardian's
custody and fail to conduct a shelter hearing, in violation of Utah law?
C. Statement of Relief Sought
Petitioners pray for the following relief from this Court:
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1. An order requiring the DCFS and the juvenile court trial judge to hold
a shelter hearing regarding the removal of C.K. from Val Newman's
custody, to allow full and fair hearing on the relevant issues.
2. An order staying the juvenile court proceedings regarding the
adoption of C.K., in case number 920469 in the Third District Juvenile
Court of Salt Lake County, to allow the shelter hearing to proceed.
3. An order requiring the DCFS and the juvenile court judge to conduct
any subsequent activity or hearing in compliance with Utah law and
the Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure.
D. Statement of Facts
c

1. The various players in this matter are:
C.K.
J.K. and Ch.K.
Ruth Kofod
Val Newman
S.O. and J.O.

minor child, the subject of the dispute
C.K.'s natural parents
C.K.'s paternal grandmother and J.O/s mother
C.K.'s paternal aunt, J.O/s sister
Ch.K.'s children from previous relationships

2. On September 7,1996, DCFS personnel removed S.O. and J.O. from
their mother's home based on an allegation of physical abuse.
Pursuant to the State's Verified Petition, and following a shelter
hearing, the juvenile court granted temporary custody and
guardianship of these two minors to the DCFS. The court also ordered
the DCFS to provide necessary services to J.K and Ch.K. with the goal
of reuniting the two minors with their mother.
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3. In contrast, the DCFS was never granted temporary custody and
guardianship of C.K. Her parents, J.K. and Ch.K., voluntarily granted
custody and guardianship of C.K. to her paternal grandparents, John
and Ruth Kofod.
4. On October 10,1996, the State moved to amend its Verified Petition
regarding S.O. and J.O. to include C.K. In its motion, the State
recognized that C.K. had been voluntarily placed with Petitioners. See
attached Exhibit 1.
5. By order dated November 6,1996, the juvenile court recognized John
and Ruth Kofod as C.K/s legal guardians, and ordered the DCFS to
provide services to C.K. and her grandparents, again with the goal of
reunifying C.K. with her parents. See attached Exhibit 2.
6. On March 20,1997, the juvenile court modified its previous order, on
the State's motion, to grant custody and guardianship of C.K. to Ruth
Kofod alone. John Kofod was given the express right to request a
hearing to show cause why the change should not remain in effect. See
attached Exhibit 3.
7. On April 8,1997, again on the State's motion, the juvenile court
modified its previous orders to grant custody and guardianship of
C.K. to Val Newman, on the grounds that C.K. had always resided
with Ms. Newman. See attached Exhibit 4.
Pa^c4 oi 22
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8. On October 24,1997, the juvenile court held a hearing pursuant to the
State's motion to review the placement plans of the three minor
children. At that time the court ordered that C.K. be removed from her
aunt's custody, and gave Ms. Newman 30 days to "come forward with
counsel and address the issue further/7 See attached Exhibit 5.
9. No shelter hearing regarding C.K/s removal from Ms. Newman's
custody was held, as required by Utah Code Ann. sec. 78-3a-306.
10. Ms. Newman was unable to find counsel that she could afford, but on
November 14,1997, she filed a letter requesting that custody of C.K. be
returned to her. See attached Exhibit 6.
11. On February 13,1998, the juvenile court denied Ms. Newman's
motion. See attached Exhibit 7.
12. The State has petitioned to terminate J.K.'s and Ch.K/s parental rights
over all three minors. Trial on that petition is set for April 20 and 21,
1998. Assuming the parental rights are terminated, C.K. will be
immediately eligible for adoption.
E. Statement of Reasons Why No Other Plain, Speedy, or Adequate Remedy
Exists, and Why Writ Should Issue
In the normal course of juvenile court procedure, an aggrieved party may
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. In this case, however, there has been no
final order from which to appeal. Petitioners are concerned about the juvenile
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State's violation of their due process by failing to provide the statutorv shelter
hearing.
C.K. was removed from Ms. Newman's custody in October of 1997. At
that time, she and Petitioner Ruth Kofod were not represented by counsel. The
juvenile court informed them that Ms. Newman could file a petition with the
juvenile court to review the matter, which she did. The court did not hold or
consider a shelter hearing, as required by Utah law. In fact, the court and the
DCFS continued to encourage Petitioners to work within the DCFS system.
C.K.'s permanent adoption by unrelated parties is now imminent. Absent
extraordinary relief from this Court, Petitioners will be denied the opportunity to
hear from the DCFS and to present evidence of their own regarding whether the
State appropriately removed C.K. from Ms. Newman's custody. Absent
extraordinary relief from this Court, the State's infringement of Petitioners' due
process rights regarding C.K.'s removal from custody will lead to C.K. being lost
to her grandmother and aunt permanently without any recourse.
F. Statement of Impracticability of Writ in District Court
Given that the juvenile court is a department of the district courts, it is
inappropriate to direct this petition to the Third Judicial District Court.
Therefore, this petition is directed to the Court of Appeals, as the appropriate
venue for review of juvenile court decision. Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Hon. Kunberly
Hornak, 917 P.2d 79 (Utah App. 1996).
Pa^e n of 22
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G. Memorandum of Points and Authorities
Petitions for extraordinary relief are equitable in nature. Sandy City v. Salt
Lake County, 827 P.2d 227 (Utah 1992). In juvenile court we are primarily
concerned with the best interests of the child, as balanced against the due process
rights of the child's guardians. The Utah State Legislature has provided that
children may be removed from their homes if there is substantial danger of
harm. The Legislature also has protected the due process rights of the guardians,
however, by requiring the juvenile court to hold a shelter hearing within 72
hours after a child is removed, in order to ensure that the State has appropriate
grounds for that removal.
In this case, Petitioners, C.K/s legal guardians, have been stripped of their
due process rights. The juvenile court held no shelter hearing, and C.K/s
removal from her aunt's custody and guardianship has never been reviewed
under the process the Utah statute contemplates.
This memorandum makes the following points:
•

The equitable interests of C.K. in this case outweigh any possible
inconvenience the State may suffer from the issuance of the
extraordinary writ requested here.

•

The State is required to hold a shelter hearing to review C.K/s removal
from Ms. Newman's custody.

•

Ms. Newman's custody of C.K. cannot be considered a kinship
placement.

•

None of the hearings held after October, 1997 can be considered shelter
hearings.
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•

The DCFS has violated its statutory obligation to piotect the stability of
families in this case.

The equitable interests of CK. in this case outweigh any possible
inconvenience the State may suffer from the issuance of the extraordinary writ
requested here.
The facts are very simple in this case. The State removed C.K. from her
legal guardian and failed to provide a shelter hearing as required by law. At that
time, they were not represented by counsel and were unaware of the right to a
shelter hearing. They innocently followed the juvenile court's and the DCFS's
suggestions in an attempt to have custody of C.K. returned to them. Matters
have now proceeded to a point where, if the Court of Appeals does not
intervene, C.K. will be adopted by an unrelated family, without the Petitioners
ever having the opportunity to understand and rebut any evidence the State may
have to justify removing C.K. from Petitioners' love and care.
It is Petitioners' ultimate goal to adopt C.K. They understand that they
must file the appropriate papers and be found fit to do so. They should not be
denied that opportunity, however, merely because the State did not follow its
own law and procedures in this case.
On the other hand, the State's valid interests in C.K.'s welfare will not be
harmed if Petitioners are given the right to a shelter hearing. The State will
merely be required to show at the shelter hearing that any one of the situations
listed in section 78-3a-306(8) is present with regard to the Petitioners, something
it must do by law anyway.

Pa£Q 8 or 22
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The State is required to hold a shelter hearing to review C.K.'s removal from
Ms. Newman's custody.
The DCFS and the juvenile court admit in several pleadings that C.K/s
natural parents voluntarily gave custody and guardianship of C.K. to her
grandmother, and eventually to her aunt. See Exhibits 1 and 2, for example. The
State must, therefore, hold a shelter hearing upon removing C.K. from her
grandmother and aunt.
The importance of this point is best illustrated by looking at an analogous
situation. In a situation where the natural parents of a child are not married or do
not live together, the custodial parent can voluntarily transfer custody and
guardianship of this child to the other parent. If the State believes the child is in
danger, under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. sec. 78-3a-301 the State may
remove the child from the home. Within 72 hours after the removal, however, the
State must show that the child is indeed in danger and should not be returned to
the current custodial parent. If the juvenile court agrees that the State has proven
its case, custody and guardianship passes to the DCFS who is then ordered to
find an appropriate placement for the child.
The situation in this case is no different. C.K/s natural parents voluntarily
gave custody and guardianship of her to a family member. The State had a right
to remove her from that guardian, if it felt she was in danger under the
provisions of sec. 78-3a-301. The State also had an obligation, however, to prove
at a shelter hearing within 72 hours that C.K. was in fact in danger in her aunt's
Pago 9nl 22
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custody. This it did not do, and custody of C.K. was given to the DCFS in
violation of the statute and without any due process.
Ms. Newman's custody of C.K. cannot be considered a kinship placement.
The State cannot now argue that C.K. was placed with Val Newman as a
kinship placement under Utah Code Ann. sec. 78-3a-307, and that therefore no
shelter hearing is required upon removing C.K. from Ms. Newman's custody.
That statute requires that the court determine at a shelter hearing upon
removing the child from her parents whether the child should be placed with a
noncustodial parent or another family member.
In this case, there was no shelter hearing regarding C.K/s removal from
her parent's home. No shelter hearing was necessary as her parents voluntarily
gave custody to C.K/s grandparents. Since no shelter hearing was held, the State
did not receive temporary custody or the opportunity to provide a kinship
placement under sec. 78-3a-307. Any attempt to characterize Ms. Newman's
custody of C.K. as a kinship placement now merely ignores the explicit
provisions of the law.
The juvenile court did order that the DCFS provide protective placement
services to C.K., in his order of November 6,1996. See Exhibit 2. This provision in
no way transforms C.K/s residence with her aunt as a kinship placement.
Individuals are free to accept protective placement services voluntarily. In this
case, since all parties, including the DCFS, assumed that the three minor children

Page 10 of 22
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Petition for Extraordinary Relief
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

would eventually be reunited with their parents, it in natural that C.K. receive
the same kind of reunification services as her siblings.
None of the hearings held after October, 1997 can be considered shelter
hearings.
In its February 18,1998 order, the juvenile court admits that no shelter
hearing was held, by stating that no shelter hearing is required.
The State cannot now correct its failure to provide a shelter hearing after
removing C.K. from Ms. Newman's custody by characterizing any subsequent
hearing as a "shelter hearing/' Any subsequent hearing suffers from several
major flaws.
First, no hearing was held within 72 hours as required by section 7873a306(1). The statute is clear. Under section 78-3a-306(7), the court may, for good
cause, grant no more than one continuance of the shelter hearing, but not to
exceed five days.
Second, the proper notice was not given to Val Newman, as C.K.'s legal
guardian. Section 78-3a-306(2) requires that the DCFS provide notice that
contains very specific information:
a) the name and address of the person to whom the notice is directed
b) the date, time, and place of the shelter hearing
c) the name of the minor on whose behalf a petition is being brought
d) a concise statement regarding the allegations and code sections
under which the proceeding has been instituted
e) a statement that the guardian to whom notice is given, and the
minor, are entitled to have an attorney present at the shelter hearing
Page 11 of 22
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Petition for Extraordinary Relief

f) a statement that the guardian is liable for the cost of support of the
minor in the custody of the DCFS
Even if we assume that all subsequent pleadings issued by the State
contained the bare minimum information regarding C.K/s name and the date,
time, and place of some type of hearing, none of the highlighted information was
included. Petitioners cannot be considered to have received due notice that any
hearings held after C.K/s removal from Ms. Newman's custody were shelter
hearings.
Third, at a shelter hearing the juvenile court must make certain very
specific findings under sections 78-3a-306(8), (9), and (13):
a) by the preponderance of the evidence that one or more described
dangerous situations exists
b) a determination as to whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent
or eliminate the need for removal and whether there are available
services that would prevent the need for continued removal
c) the facts on which the decision is based
None of the court's orders in this matter after October, 1997 contain this
vital information. This omission not only prevents any hearing from being
considered a shelter hearing, but it also illustrates the dilemma the Petitioners
find themselves in. Without a proper order, there is nothing to appeal.
Section 78-3a-306(14) does provide that the juvenile court may order
continued removal of the child regardless of any error in the initial removal or
any lack of proper notice or other procedural requirements. The State cannot rely
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on this provision to justify its failure to provide a shelter hearing; the provision
only applies in the context of a shelter hearing.
The DCFS has violated its statutory obligation to protect the stability of
families in this case.
The Utah statutes cited in this memorandum clearly obligate the DCFS to
consider the due process rights of parents and legal guardians. This obligation is
made explicit in section 78-3a-315. That section, regarding the procedural rights
of foster families, discusses the importance of family stability, and provides
specific due process rights to foster families in pursuit of that goal.
Foster families are only given physical custody of the foster child, not
legal custody or guardianship which remains in the State. How much more
important, then, are the due process rights of legal guardians, who have more
than mere physical custody of the child. The court and the DCFS recognized in
several orders that first Ms. Kofod and later Ms. Newman had full legal
guardianship over C.K. See for example the court's order on March 20,1997
(Exhibit 3) that the change of custody and guardianship be subject to the rights of
John Kofod.
Yet, the State offered to the Petitioners not even the due process it would
offer a foster family upon removing C.K. from her aunt's custody. As a result,
C.K. has suffered unnecessary disruption of her family life.
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WHEREFORE, Val Newman and Ruth Kofod hereby petition this Court
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d) and Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 19 for an order requiring the trial court and the DCFS to provide
proper notice of and conduct a shelter hearing regarding C.K/s removal from
Val Newman's custody, and an order staying any adoption proceedings
regarding C.K. pending the outcome of the shelter hearing.
DATED this f^Khday of

J|>TL(

1997.

Toni Marie Sutliff
Attorney for Petitioners

/{, /
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Toni Marie Sutliff #4155
1631 South 800 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
(801)736-5107
Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
The State of Utah,
In the interest of:

])

Petition to Restore Custody

Cori Kofod

j

Case No. 920469

)>
)

Hon. Charles D. Behrens

(04/08/96),

a person under eighteen years
of age.

Petitioner, Val Newman, through her attorney, Toni Marie Sutliff, hereby
petitions this Court for an order restoring custody of Cori Kofod to her. This
Petition is based on the fact that the grounds on which Cori Kofod was removed
from Petitioner's home are no longer present. Specifically, Petitioner has an
approved home study, a copy of which is attached, and to the best of her
knowledge both she and her husband, Danny Newman, have passed the Bureau
of Criminal Identification background check and neither of them has any
substantiated abuse referrals in the Child Abuse Registry.
Petitioner requests that this Court set a hearing on this Petition and issue
an order restoring custody of Cori Kofod to her.
DATED thiscflkfc day of August, 1998.

Toni Marie Sutliff
Attorney for Petitioner
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ^4n\day of August, 1998, I caused to be
mailed, first class, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Petition to Restore Custody to:
Perri Babilis
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Elizabeth M. Knight
Guardian ad Litem
210 West 10000 South, 2nd Floor
Sandy, Utah 84070
Dorothy Pendleton
Adoption Worker
Division of Child and Family Services
1385 South State, Room 111
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
c

Toni Marie Sutliff
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
In and For Salt Lake County, State of Utah
•

i

STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of
KOFOD, Cori

4/8/96

!
;

NOTICE OF HEARING
Case No.: 920469

i
i

A person under eighteen years of age !

Notice is hereby given that the above-entitled matter has been
set for a pre-trial hearing on Mr. Sutliff's Petition to Restore
Custody before Judge Charles D. Behrens, Jr., Third District
Juvenile Court, 210 West 10000 South, Sandy Utah 84070, for the
2bth day of September, 1998 at 10:00 a.m., and your presence is
necessary.
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act,
individuals needing special accommodations (including auxiliary
communicative aids and services) during this proceeding should call
Roy Whitehouse at 265-5911, at least three working days prior to
the proceeding.
Dated this 28th day of August, 1998,

J. Keil
Deputy Clerk
cc:

Perri Babalis, A/G
Elizabeth Knight, GAL
Dorothy Pendleton, DCFS

Toni Marie Sutliff
Attorney-at-Law
1631 South 800 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84105
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FILED
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
In and For Salt Lake County, State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of
KOFOD, Cori

4/8/96

SEP 0 3 1998

NOTICE OF RESCHEDULED
HEARING
Case No,: 920469

A person under eighteen years of age
Notice is hereby given that due to circumstances, the above
entitled matter previously scheduled for hearing on September 25,
1998 at 10:00 a.m. before Judge Charles D. Behrens, Jr. in the
above entitled Court, 210 West 10000 South, Sandy, Utah 840701799. has now been rescheduled for October 5, 1998 at 10:00 a.m.
Please make note of this necessary change and thank you for
your cooperation*
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act,
individuals needing special accommodations (including auxiliary
communicative aids and services) during this proceeding should
call Bruce Thomas at 238-7898, at least three working days prior
to the proceeding.
Dated September 3, 1998.

P. J. Keil
Deputy Court Clerk
cc:

Perri Babalis, A/G
Elizabeth Knight, GAL
Dorothy Pendleton, DCFS

Toni Marie Sutliff
Attorney-at-Law
1631 South 800 East
Salt Lake City, UT

84105
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